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Is a Sense of Inequity an Ancestral Primate Trait? Testing Social Inequity
in Cotton Top Tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)
Julie J. Neiworth, Elizabeth T. Johnson, Katherine Whillock, Julia Greenberg, and Vanessa Brown
Carleton College
To address a controversy in the literature concerning whether monkeys show an aversion to inequity,
individuals of a New World monkey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) were tested in an
offering task and in a bartering task. At issue was whether the monkeys rejected rewards because of a
violation of expectancy of the preferred reward, or whether they rejected rewards because of a sensitivity
to socially mediated inequity. The data from both tasks indicated that the subjects were more likely to
reject when preferred rewards were presented, either because of another animal eating the reward (the
social condition) or because of rewards being presented but inaccessible. The bartering task led to the
only behavioral indication of aversion due specifically to social inequity, which was demonstrated when
tamarins’ sensitivity to the difference in rewards increased with exposure to other tamarins working to
receive the preferred rewards. The results suggest that social inequity aversion will be assessed by
tamarins, and possibly by other primates, only under conditions of limited resources and a requirement
of work, which may make the situation a bit more competitive and thus drives attention toward both
social and reward evaluation.
Keywords: inequity, social, tamarins, primates, evolution
Tomasello (1999, 2003) and Hare (2007) have argued that the
uniqueness of human thought emerged from evolved specialized
social awareness. One such specialized ability may be the judg-
ment of fairness and equity within a social field (Fehr & Fisch-
bacher, 2003). Humans show a strong aversion to inequity among
partners (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), and this aversion is found in
many different human societies, establishing it as a generalized
universal human cognition (Heinrich et al., 2001). There is further
evidence of its universal reaction among humans in that an unfair
social condition activates areas in the human brain normally asso-
ciated with physical disgust and negative emotional affect (Sanfey,
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Establishing equity
and fairness among a group of humans is valued as moral and civil
in human society; thus it is intriguing to wonder from what
evolutionary precursors these abilities emerged. Clearly, one
would need sensitivity to notice unfair social situations and an
ability to act differently when inequity is noted (de Waal, 2008),
but are these abilities unique to humans?
A flurry of studies recently tested whether monkeys or apes
show a sensitivity toward inequity when working among partners
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, in capuchins [Cebus apella]; Roma,
Silberberg, Ruggiero, & Suomi, 2006, in capuchins; Dubreuil,
Gentile, & Visalberghi, 2006, in capuchins; Brauer, Call, & To-
masello, 2006; and Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007, in chimpan-
zees [Pan troglodytes]). For example, Jensen et al. (2007) tested
chimpanzees in an “ultimatum game” and found that the chimpan-
zees acted as rational decision-makers who accepted lesser re-
wards in unfair circumstances when a partner got more. This
outcome did not match the outcome of humans who rejected the
lesser amount if it was made unfair by the circumstances (i.e., a
more fair option had been available). Interestingly, human partic-
ipants accepted the lesser amount only if the alternative to accep-
tance was nothing. This suggests that unfair circumstances are
considered and weighed differently by humans than they are by
nonhuman apes.
Brosnan and de Waal (2003) found that 5 female capuchins, a
primate species not closely related to humans within the primate
classification, were less likely to exchange a token for a less
preferred food if they viewed a partner who exchanged a token for
a more preferred food. Moreover, the capuchins were more likely
to refuse work for a less preferred food if the partner was given a
more preferred food without having to exchange anything, or in
other words, for no work at all. Importantly, the capuchins were
also more likely to refuse to exchange tokens for the less preferred
food if the more preferred food was present, a nonsocial condition
involving the preferred reward. Brosnan and de Waal claimed that
the results overall demonstrated an inequity aversion in capuchins.
While they conceded that the nonsocial preferred reward condition
generated a similar increase in rejection, they found that the
rejection rates to the less preferred food decreased over trials in the
nonsocial condition but did not decrease in the social condition.
Thus they claimed that the addition of the social feature heightened
the rejection rate by capuchins.
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According to Heinrich (2004), the capuchins’ increased rejec-
tion is not predicted from a reaction that would be typical of
humans, because the capuchins rejected a lesser reward in order to
obtain nothing. Fontenot, Watson, Roberts, and Miller (2007) used
a bartering task with capuchins and failed to find an effect of
inequity or of differences in work effort in the capuchins’ accep-
tance and consumption of a nonpreferred reward, further drawing
into question the finding. The conclusions drawn by Brosnan and
de Waal (2003) have been criticized by Wynne (2004), Roma et al.
(2006), and Dubreuil et al. (2006), and in most cases the critics
claimed that the rejections shown by capuchins may have been a
result of a violation of expectancy in the food provided rather than
an assessment of inequity in the social situation. To further test the
alternative that the monkeys were reacting to a violation in ex-
pected food, Dubreuil et al. (2006) offered capuchins the chance to
take a less preferred reward when a preferred reward was pre-
sented (i.e., shown then hidden, presented in another cage, or given
to a partner), and in all cases in which the preferred reward was
shown and regardless of whether a partner was involved, the
capuchins were less likely to initiate a trial to choose the less
preferred food. In contrast, van Wolkenten, Brosnan, and de Waal
(2007) recently found that capuchins did not reject more when a
preferred reward was merely presented, although they continued to
reject more when their partners received a preferred reward.
Roma et al. (2006) argued that the refusals were an expression
of the frustration effect often noted in rats and pigeons when
schedules of reward are changed from a preferred reward to a less
preferred one (for a review, see Amsel, 1958). Using methods
similar to those found in Dubreuil et al. (2006), Roma et al. found
that capuchins were more likely to refuse less preferred rewards if
they had previously received the more preferred rewards. In fact,
Dindo and de Waal (2007) gave pairs of capuchins food trays and
did not find a difference in consumption of the food; rather they
found that capuchins ate the less preferred food more rapidly if
their partners received preferred food, a reaction that is the oppo-
site the rejection of the less preferred food in the 2003 study.
Dindo and de Waal (2007) argued that the tasks themselves gen-
erate different types of reactions by capuchins: Offering a capu-
chin food items (an “offering” task) generates foraging strategies,
including social facilitation of eating and scramble competition.
Requiring capuchins to exchange tokens to acquire a reward (a
“bartering” task) induces a comparison of costs and payoffs be-
tween capuchins and their partners and thus rejections when ineq-
uity is noticed.
The current study uses both a bartering method and an offering
method to test inequity aversion in cotton top tamarins, a member
of the callitrichid New World monkey subfamily taxonomy. It is
important to compare the rejection rates of a single species of
monkey across the two tasks (offering and bartering) to determine
whether the bartering task generates a unique sensitivity to the
social variables of inequity and fairness. It is imperative that a New
World monkey species other than capuchins is tested, because
researchers have suggested that capuchins evolved specialized
social skills because of their extensive use of tools, their cooper-
ative hunting, and published evidence of social awareness (for a
review, see Parker & McKinney, 1999). Cotton top tamarins
exhibit well-developed social abilities, including cooperative
breeding (Kostan & Snowdon, 2002), cooperation in tasks (Cronin,
Kurian, & Snowdon, 2005; Hauser, Chen, Chen, & Chuang, 2003),
tolerated food sharing (Feistner & Price, 1999, 2000; McConkey,
2000; Price & Feistner, 2001), and shared visual attention (Nei-
worth, Burman, Basile, & Lickteig, 2002). If inequity aversion is
an evolved ancestral trait present in primates, there should be
evidence of it in many species of monkeys, especially those who
show similar social awareness capacities.
One method, a bartering task, required the tamarins to drop a
wooden token in a cup in order to acquire a less preferred reward.
In another method, an offering task, a different group of tamarins
was simply offered a less preferred reward. The rate of rejection of
the less preferred reward was measured in a variety of social and
nonsocial conditions. Subjects were exposed to different orders of
conditions in both the bartering task and the offering task. This
design insured that rejection rates were not a function of consistent
switching from preferred to less preferred rewards in the design. In
fact, each subject had to demonstrate adequate baseline perfor-
mance of accepting the less preferred reward 80% of the time
before each condition was conducted. Thus the difference in re-
jection was a true measure of the condition and not a lingering
effect of switching reward types.
This study allowed a direct examination of rate of rejections in
both tasks. If presence of the preferred reward generates higher
rates of rejection, then subjects in both tasks should reject more
often when the preferred food is present, both when a partner eats
it (i.e., in food inequity conditions), and when it is present in the
environment (preferred food control). If the task characteristics
invoke different assessments by monkeys, the offering task should
generate assessments around the food itself and thus rejection
based on violations of expected rewards regardless of social or
nonsocial conditions. In contrast, the bartering task should induce
an assessment of payoff and fairness since more work is involved
and the work is explicitly tied to the reward.
Method
Subjects
A total of 11 adult cotton top tamarins, 6 females and 5 males,
ranging in age from 3 years to 14 years old, were in the study.
There were 5 subjects in the bartering task, including 3 females
(Fozzy, Olympia, and Ophelia) and 2 males (Zhivago and Vul-
ture). The subjects were tested in pairs, with Olympia and Vulture,
a breeding couple, tested as a pair, and Fozzy, Zhivago, and
Ophelia, a nonbreeding couple and adjacent cagemate, tested in
pairs via the trio. In the bartering task, 4 of the 5 monkeys were
both subjects and models, taking on each of the roles for all of the
conditions before being switched to the other role.1 Each subject
was exposed to the conditions of the bartering task in a different
order and each was randomly selected as subject or model first. All
5 subjects had never participated in a study involving social
variables other than testing for shared visual attention, and they
had not been tested in any cooperative task or in any social
inequity situation. All subjects except Vulture had been exposed in
prior studies to mirrors and to digitized images of themselves, to
digitized images of other animals, to hidden treats in cups, and to
discriminations of numbers of objects and objects constructed of
1 Ophelia was a subject in the bartering task only.
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small graphic shapes, all printed in two-dimensional form on
plastic cards.
There were 6 subjects in the offering task, 3 females (Quince,
Encore, and Cezanne) and 3 males (Willow, Heron, and Quaker).
All 6 subjects were naı¨ve to any social inequity or cooperative
situation. All subjects in the offering task had been exposed to
mirrors and to discriminations of numbers of objects and objects
constructed of elements, all printed in two-dimensional form on
plastic cards. These subjects were also tested in pairs, formed as
nonbreeding pairs Willow and Quince, and Cezanne and Quaker,
and breeding pair Encore and Heron. Subjects participated as
subjects and as models with order of position and order of condi-
tions counterbalanced across the group.
The monkeys had been monkey-family reared in laboratory
settings and had been socially housed in pairs or larger family
groups in 0.85  1.50  2.3 m cages, with the cages visually
separated by opaque sheets. The subjects were on a 12-hr light/
dark cycle and had free access to water. They were maintained on
a complete diet consisting of a yogurt-applesauce breakfast, a
lunch of Zupreem Marmoset chow and fruits and vegetables, and
an afternoon protein snack (e.g., eggs, hamburger, peanuts, cottage
cheese, and mealworms) daily. The experiments were conducted
between meals, in the morning between breakfast and lunch, or in
the afternoon between lunch and snack. Subjects were not food
deprived but were offered a less preferred fruit (grapes) or a highly
preferred sugared cereal (Berry TrixTM, Apple CrunchiesTM, or
Froot LoopsTM) for participating.
Apparatus
A white projector cart measuring 1.17 m in height with a shelf
measuring 40  50 cm was used in the food control condition of
both tasks and in all conditions in the bartering task. Also in the
food control condition in both tasks, the preferred reward was
presented as several pieces of sugared cereal (Froot LoopsTM,
Apple CrunchiesTM, or Berry TrixTM) sealed inside a transparent
plastic dome measuring 5 cm in diameter with a height of 3.8 cm,
which was glued on top of a small wood base measuring 6 5 cm.
In the bartering task, we used as tokens colorful small magenta,
yellow, and green wooden figures manufactured for parrot use and
shaped as rectangles, squares, and circles measuring on average
2  3.5 cm with a thickness of 8 mm. Paper cups with a 5 cm
base were cut down in size to measure 2 cm in height, and these
were placed on the cart upright and were the mechanism by which
the subjects were trained to deposit their tokens to exchange them
for a reward.
Procedure
In all tasks, the tamarins were tested in their home cages. The
subjects had participated in a number of studies in which an
individual of the pair was called to participate at the beginning of
each trial. The tamarins were quite familiar with this kind of
procedure and readily came close to the experimenter when called.
Both tamarins attended to the tasks while one was participating.
There were a total of 5 experimenters who conducted the tasks and
were all trained to copy the exact movements described here in the
procedure. The interpretation of the response was very clear: either
a tamarin took a reward from one’s hand within a particular period
of time, or a tamarin placed a token inside a cup and accepted a
food item by removing it from one’s hand within a particular
period of time. All experimenters watched Julie J. Neiworth demon-
strate this with subjects when being trained, and she monitored the
experimenters on 20% of the trials within the two procedures with
100% agreement on responses by tamarins in the various tasks.
Reward Pretest
We first determined whether each pair of subjects preferred
sugared cereal to the less preferred rewards, which were quartered
pieces of grape. This was accomplished by placing multiple pieces
of both items in a bowl and presenting the bowl to each subject for
30 s. The number of pieces eaten was counted for the first 10 s of
the exposure. All 11 subjects ate all pieces of at least one type of
cereal before eating grapes. Within the pairs, one type of cereal
seemed preferred by the pair over the other types of cereal, but
cereal was always consumed before grapes by all tamarins. The
preferred cereal was defined as the preferred reward for each pair,
while grapes were defined as the less preferred reward.
Bartering Task
Each subject was first shaped in successive approximations to
exchange a wooden token for a quarter piece of grape. These
shaping sessions consisted of 10 trials per day, each lasting 60 s.
For each trial, the experimenter would call a subject down to the
cart and require that the subject sit on the cart in front of the
experimenter. Then the experimenter would offer the token by
hand to the subject and reward the subject with a quarter grape for
touching the wooden token. The next step, after subjects demon-
strated accomplishing this touching response for 8 out of 10 trials,
was to call the subject down and reward him or her for holding and
dropping the token into a cup fortuitously positioned directly under
the monkey’s paws for a quarter grape. Each step required a
response in 8 out of 10 trials in a session to move to the next step.
Once subjects were reliably holding and dropping the token to
acquire rewards, the subject was called down to the cart and the
token was presented to the subject while the cup was moved by a
single 5-cm increment to the left on the cart. This movement
forced the subjects to hold the token for a longer period of time and
to physically move and then drop the token in the cup in order to
obtain a reward. Within any one trial, the subjects were given 10 s
to emit the response properly, and if they missed the cup within the
10 s, they could retrieve the token and try again. After 10 s of
missing the cup, no rewards were given for that trial. Once the cup
could be placed at least 10 cm from the center point of the cart, and
the subject had successfully dropped the token in the cup for a
reward within the first 10 s of each trial on 8 out of 10 consecutive
trials, the experiment began.
Five conditions were conducted in counterbalanced order such
that 1 subject started in one of the different conditions described in
the next sections. For each condition, subjects were tested in five
daily sessions, each consisting of five 60-s trials. This rate of
exposure matches Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) original study
using a bartering method. In between conditions, subjects and
models were required to pass a “baseline” condition in which they
traded tokens in 10-trial sessions for one-quarter grape rewards
until they reached the criterion of 8 out of 10 successful trades
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within a session. The monkey that was randomly assigned the model
position first remained the model throughout the conditions, and then
the roles were reversed. The five conditions are described next.
Food equity. In the food equity condition, the model was first
called down to the cart and handed a token to trade (by depositing
it in a cup 10 cm away) for a quarter grape. The model was
required to successfully make the trade for the grape before the
trial started for the subject. Once the model demonstrated this
behavior, the subject was tested on a single trial. The subject was
called to the cart and was handed a token by the experimenter to
deposit in the cup to acquire a quarter grape. Refusal to accept the
token or refusal to take the quarter grape after making a deposit
were both counted as refusals. An accept response was recorded if
the subject took the token and successfully traded it for a quarter
grape. After each trial for the subject, a 15-s intertrial interval (ITI)
was presented, and then the model was made to demonstrate the
trading behavior for the quarter grape before the next trial for the
subject began. The subject was tested in 5 trials per session, and
after 5 consecutive sessions, the subject and model were placed in
a baseline condition of trading for grapes in 10-trial sessions until
they met criterion of 8 out of 10 successful trades within a session.
Food inequity. In this condition, the model was first called
down to the cart and handed a token. When the model demon-
strated the appropriate trade by depositing the token in the cup, the
model was given the preferred reward, a sugared cereal. Immedi-
ately following this event, a trial began for the subject. In this case,
as in the conditions before, the subject was handed a token that he
or she could trade for a quarter grape. The trial lasted 60 s and a
successful or refusal response was noted, followed by a 15-s ITI.
Then the model would trade for the preferred reward again, fol-
lowed by the next trial for the subject. Each session consisted of
five trials for the subject, and after five sessions, both model and
subject were required to trade for quartered grapes until meeting
criterion in a baseline condition.
Work inequity. Each trial started with the model being handed
1/4 a quarter grape without the requirement of trading a token
first. Once the model obtained the quarter grape, the subject was
called down and was offered a token to trade (by depositing into
the cup) for a quarter grape. Again there were five trials per
session, with each trial for the subject preceded by the model
demonstration. After five consecutive sessions, the subject and
model were placed in the baseline trading condition until criterion
was met.
Food  work inequity. In this condition, the model was
handed a preferred reward of sugared cereal without the require-
ment of trading at the beginning of each trial. Then the subject was
tested in the bartering task, again for a quarter grape. Before each
of the five trials per session, the model was handed the preferred
reward and then the trial for the subject began. There were 5
consecutive sessions of 5 trials per session, and then both subject
and model were placed in baseline training in10-trial sessions until
they traded for grapes in 8 of 10 trials within a single session.
Food control. This is the only condition that did not involve a
model at all. Instead, before each trial was initiated for the subject,
a plastic dome-covered wood base containing the preferred reward,
sugared cereals, was placed on the cart. Then the subject was
called down to the cart and was offered a token to deposit in the
cup for a quarter grape. The subject was given 60 s to make the
trade, and then the trial ended with a 15-s ITI, during which time
the preferred food was removed from the cart. At the beginning of
the next trial, the food inside the domed container was placed again
on the cart, and the monkey was called down to start the next trial.
After five consecutive sessions consisting of five trials per session,
the subject and model were put in the baseline condition of trading
for grapes to meet criterion.
Offering Task
This task required that subjects approach the closed hand of the
experimenter when the experimenter called his or her name. Then
the experimenter would open the hand, palm up, to reveal the
reward that was offered for a 60-s period. If the subject took the
reward offered within the 60 s, the response was recorded as an
accept; otherwise the lack of response was recorded as a reject.
There was a 15-s ITI that separated trials. Subjects readily took
items from experimenters when the items were handed to them
with a thumb and finger grasp by the experimenter. Thus there was
some pretraining involved in inducing subjects to approach a
closed fist and take items from an open palm. Once subject and
model could accomplish taking items in 8 out of 10 consecutive
trials in a session, the experiment began. In this task, three con-
ditions were conducted in counterbalanced order across subjects.
There were 2 subjects out of the 6 that started in one of the three
conditions described. The monkey randomly assigned the model
position first remained the model throughout the conditions for the
subject, and then the roles were reversed.
Food equity. Each trial was preceded by the model being offered
a quarter grape in an open palm. Once the model took the grape, the
trial for the subject began. The subject was called down while the
experimenter offered a closed fist high in the branches of the home
cage. Once the subject was near, the experimenter opened the fist to
reveal the palm containing a quarter grape. The subject was allowed
60 s of time to take or refuse the reward. Sessions consisted of 10
trials, which better matched other studies that used an offering meth-
odology (i.e., Roma et al., 2006), and each trial was preceded by the
model behavior. After five consecutive sessions, the subject and
model were placed in 10-trial baseline sessions in which they were
alternately offered quartered grapes until both took them in 8 out of 10
trials within a single session.
Food inequity. In this condition, the model was called down first
to a closed fist that was opened to reveal the preferred reward that he
or she could take. Once the model accepted the reward, the trial began
for the subject, who was called down to a closed fist and then offered
a quarter grape in the open palm. The same number of trials, sessions,
and follow-up baseline conditions were used.
Food control. The model was not involved in this condition;
rather the cart was placed in the home cage for each 10-trial
session, and each trial began with a presentation of the domed
container containing the preferred cereal. The subject was then
called down toward a closed fist, which opened to reveal a quarter
grape in the open palm. The same number of trials, sessions, and
baseline conditions were used.
Results
The trading response in the bartering task took an average of 63
sessions (range  43–121 sessions) until subjects could reliably
meet the criterion of 8 successful trades out of 10 consecutive
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trials. The accept response to an open palm in the offering task was
acquired on average in 9 sessions (range  3 to 16 sessions). An
interesting outcome noted immediately was that subjects in the
bartering task who were required to trade with tokens for a reward
rejected far less overall than did the group in the offering task,
which simply accepted or rejected food in an open palm, indepen-
dent samples t(9)  5.49, p  .01. The mean rate of rejection
across all the experimental conditions (not including the baseline
scores) in the bartering task was 13.92%, while the mean rate of
rejections in the experimental conditions in the offering task was
50.00%. Next, we examined when the rejections occurred within
each of the tasks.
Bartering Task
A mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
comparing each subject’s average rejection rate for each of six
conditions (baseline, food equity, work inequity, food inequity,
food  work inequity, and food control) by the subject’s status
first as model or as subject. There was a significant condition
effect, F(5, 15)  3.56, p  .03, with a large effect size (2 
0.54). There was no difference found for subject status, F(1, 3) 
0.19, p  .69, nor for an interaction between subject status and
condition, F(5, 15)  0.32, p  .89. Figure 1 shows the rejection
rates averaged across subjects for each of the conditions.
It is important to note that rejection rates in this task were very
low. Still, a few significant differences in rejection rates emerged.
Specifically, by using paired sample t tests on average rejections
per subject, there was a significant difference between rejections in
the baseline condition (M  3.16%, SE  1.19) and the food
control condition (M  23%, SE  6.37), t(4)  3.54, p  .02,
and between rejections in the food equity condition (M  3.3%,
SE  0.86) and the food control condition, t(4)  3.87, p  .02.
This indicated that there were significantly more rejections in the
food control condition when a preferred reward was present but
unavailable than in conditions in which less preferred rewards
were offered equitably (e.g., in baseline and in food equity). There
was a nonsignificant trend difference between baseline and the
work inequity condition (M  9.0% rejection, SE  2.69), t(4) 
2.38, p  .076, and a difference between the food equity con-
dition and the work inequity condition, which also revealed a weak
trend, t(4)  2.18, p  .10. It is important to note that there were
no differences found between any of the inequity conditions with
each other (either work- or food-related), nor between any of the
inequity conditions and the food control condition (when preferred
food was presented either to a model or in a domed container).
Thus the only real significant finding was that the rejection rates
were much higher in the food control condition in which preferred
food was presented but less preferred food was given. The finding
that work inequity generated a trend difference suggests that the
tamarins may note the difference between having to trade for a less
preferred reward and getting the less preferred reward for free,
although that difference did not reach the level of significance.
A final analysis compared rejection rates by session to reveal
whether the socially mediated conditions produced different rejec-
tions over time than did the nonsocial preferred food control
condition (see Figure 2 for rejections over sessions). A repeated-
measures ANOVA first tested for differences in the last session
only across the three conditions involving preferred food: the food
control condition, the food inequity condition, and the food 
work inequity condition. This ANOVA produced a nonsignificant
effect for condition, F(1, 4)  0.19, p  .69, indicating no final
session differences among these three conditions. Moreover, a
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a nonsignificant difference
in the first sessions between condition, F(1, 4)  1.61, p  .48.
Paired-sample t tests of the rejection rates within each of the three
conditions compared the first session to the last session and re-
vealed a significant difference in the food inequity condition,
t(4)  5.715, p  .01, but not in any other condition: food
control, t(4)  0.232, p  .83; food  work inequity, t(4) 
0.302, p  .78. Specifically, rejection rates were significantly
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Figure 1. Averaged rejection rates to all the conditions during the bartering task, with 95% confidence intervals
plotted.
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higher in the last session of the food inequity condition (M 
36.0%) than they were in the first session of this condition (M 
8.0%). This was not attributable to low first-session results,
because the first sessions of all three conditions were not
different statistically from each other. This indicated that the
subjects rejected the less preferred reward in the food inequity
condition significantly more as the test went on. Still, the
food  work inequity condition, which was another socially
mediated condition involving preferred food, did not generate a
significant difference in rejection rates in the last session in
comparison with the first session.
Offering Task
A mixed-model ANOVA examined differences in subjects’
averaged rejection rates to the conditions of the task (baseline,
food equity, food inequity, and food control) as well as the
between-subjects variable of status (model first or subject first).
There was a significant condition effect, F(3, 12)  16.804, p 
.01 with a large effect size (2  0.81) but no effect of status, F(1,
4)  .034, p  .86, nor of an interaction, F(3, 12)  0.24, p  .87.
Figure 3 depicts the averaged rejection rates by condition. Pairwise
comparisons between conditions revealed that both the baseline
and equity conditions were not different from each other, t(5) 
0.28, p  .79, but each was significantly different from the food
inequity condition, t(5)  4.88, p  .01, and t(5)  6.42, p 
.01, respectively, and each was significantly different from the
food control condition, t(5)  5.73, p  .01; t(5)  5.53, p 
0.01, respectively. Thus the equity conditions produced less
rejection overall (Ms  23.89% and 22%) than did the conditions
in which a preferred reward was present, either in the case when a
partner took it in the inequity condition (M  65.67%) or when it
was present but unavailable in the food control condition (M 
50.33%). There was no difference statistically between the food
control condition and the food inequity condition, t(5)  1.96,
p  .11.
The rejection rates were analyzed by session to note any accu-
mulating differences that emerged as a function of participating in
the different conditions involving preferred rewards. Specifically,
Figure 4 reveals the pattern of rejection rates to the food control
condition and the food inequity condition. Paired sample t tests
revealed a trend difference between the last session under food
control (M  48.33%) and the last session of the food inequity
condition (73.33%), t(5)  2.03, p  .10. This trend indicated
that the subjects’ rate of rejection was somewhat higher in the last
session of the food inequity condition when the partner was
offered preferred rewards than in the last session of the food
control when the preferred reward remained present in an inacces-
sible container. There were no significant differences found within
each condition between rejections on the first session in compar-
ison with rejections on the last session: first–last food control,
t(5)  0.38, p  .72, first–last food inequity, t(5)  0.51, p 
.63. Nor were there significant differences between the first ses-
sions across the two conditions: first control versus first inequity,
t(5)  1.9, p  .12.
Discussion
All the conditions in both the bartering task and the offering task
posed the same basic problem for the tamarin subjects: whether to
accept or reject a quarter grape. The conditions presented different
events to the tamarins preceding the choice, and these events
caused some significant changes in the monkeys’ patterns of
rejections. Clearly, the monkeys rejected more often in some
conditions than in others. But what is the mediating cause of the
differential rejections?
Across both tasks, the consistent finding was that subjects
rejected the quarter grape significantly more in the food control
condition when preferred food was presented in an unattainable
way. This indicates that the presence of a preferred but unattain-
able reward caused the monkeys to reject the less preferred but
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Figure 3. Averaged rejection rates to all the conditions in the offering
task, with 95% confidence intervals plotted. Solid bars indicate that pre-
ferred food was available. Dotted bars and the open bar indicate that
quartered grapes were the only food item perceived. In all cases, subjects’
rate of rejecting quartered grapes is plotted. B indicates that condition
was significantly different from baseline at p  .01. FE indicates that
condition was significantly different from food equity at p  .01.
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Figure 2. Averaged rejection rates for the first and last sessions for all
conditions involving the presentation of preferred rewards (either under
social conditions or not) before the exchange in the bartering task. The
double asterisk denotes that the first and last session of that condition are
significantly different from each other at p  .01.
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attainable food more. There were conditions in both tasks in which
a social variable was added to this problem: A partner received a
more preferred food before the subject was given the opportunity
to accept or reject. In the bartering task, the socially mediated
conditions that are related to preferred rewards (food inequity and
food  work inequity) did not produce rejections significantly
greater than did the preferred food control condition. In the offer-
ing task, the socially mediated food inequity condition generated
significantly more rejections than did the equity conditions (both
baseline and food equity) but no difference between rejections to
it and the food control condition. In terms of the various predic-
tions set out at the beginning of this article, the results more closely
match rejection based on a violation of expected reward, because
the social cues did not cause a significant difference in rejections
beyond that caused by preferred food being presented.
But were there any noticeable effects of the social variables on
rejection rates? One subtle finding that suggested social awareness
in the tasks was uncovered by analyzing the subjects’ reactions
across sessions. In the bartering task, the food inequity condition,
which offered preferred rewards to partners and thus added a social
component to the preferred food, led to rejection rates in subjects
that increased significantly from the first to the last session (bar-
tering task). This tendency was noted in the offering task as well,
although it did not reach the level of significance in the food
inequity condition. More importantly, the presence of preferred
rewards in the food control condition did not generate a cumulative
increase in rejections in either task.
As Brosnan and de Waal (2003) found in their original study,
the addition of a social being consuming the preferred reward
induced a stronger cumulative rejection over time. This cumulative
effect was attributed by Brosnan and de Waal to an increasing
aversion to the perceived inequity between partner and subject.
Social facilitation of eating, by which an animal is more likely to
approach and eat the same food after observing another animal
doing so, has been well-established in mammals and birds (for a
historical review, see Crawford, 1939). Perhaps when food is
readily available, eating facilitates eating, as has been documented
historically and repeated by Dindo and de Waal (2007) in capu-
chins. But under conditions of restriction in which food limits
occur within an event and in which there is greater effort expended
to obtain the limited resource, the social facilitation caused by
another subject eating a preferred reward is considered differently:
It does not generate the “grab-and-go” competition that occurs
when food is more freely available; rather it produces increased
rejection of the food-getting situation, and this effect has been
found in this study and by Brosnan and de Waal (2003) and Dindo
and de Waal (2007).
There remains an inconsistent finding in this study regarding the
increased rejection induced by socially mediated inequity in the
bartering task. Specifically, the food  work inequity condition
presented a partner with a preferred food for no work, and this
condition did not increase rejection rates over time, while the food
inequity condition in which both partner and subject had to trade
tokens for food induced a significant increased rejection rate over
time. Why, under the most unfair conditions presented—unfair
rewards and unfair work comparison—did the tamarins not assess
the situation and reject more with increased exposure? Here again
the results suggest that the constraints within the task induce
different types of assessment by the tamarins. In the case of food
work inequity, the partner is simply handed the preferred item
while the subject has to work to trade a token for the less preferred
food. Here, as in the food control condition in which the preferred
food is simply presented, the preferred food handed to a partner
has a similar noncumulative effect on subjects’ rejections. The
effect of a partner eating a preferred food or a preferred food
being presented is the same. But if a partner works and obtains a
preferred reward while the subject has to work to obtain a less
preferred one, the task characteristics are of limited resources and
effort for rewards for both partner and subject. Under these con-
ditions, the rejection rates increase over time, and the aversion to
the situation grows. It is likely then that subjects can habituate
more easily to preferred foods being present or being eaten by
partners. However, when partners are acting to acquire the preferred
reward, the work of the partner and the reward are not easily ignored,
and under this condition, the subjects show increased rates of aversion
noted by increased rates of rejection with exposure.
A final difference that requires an explanation involves the type
of work and the difference in rejections induced across the tasks
and conditions. Clearly the 5 monkeys randomly placed in the
bartering task accepted significantly more often the less preferred
reward overall than did the 6 other monkeys in the offering task.
The most notable difference between the two tasks is the amount
of work put in before obtaining the less preferred reward, and the
results suggest that monkeys prize a less preferred reward more if
they have worked for it. This phenomenon is very similar to the
within-trial contrast first suggested by Zentall (2005), in which
pigeons demonstrated a preference for a stimulus associated with
more effort, a delay, or the absence of reward. Zentall argued that
such a contrast effect could explain many human social phenom-
ena, including cognitive dissonance and the justification of effort
effects, both contradictory outcomes in which humans seem to
prefer an outcome paired with more work, effort, or contrast.
When this is applied here, the monkeys seem to discriminate in the
same way and show an overall preference for accepting the less
preferred food if they have had to work for it.
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Figure 4. Averaged rejection rates for the first and last sessions for the
conditions involving the presentation of preferred rewards in the offering task.
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The tamarins in this study clearly demonstrated rejections reli-
ably across all tasks as a function of the difference between
expected and obtained reward, and this difference was not made
more striking by adding a social partner to the assessment. But the
tamarins were more willing to accept less preferred rewards when
they worked for them, and they also demonstrated a sensitivity to
others obtaining the preferred rewards through work, which in-
duced a heightened rejection reaction with exposure. The sensitiv-
ity to the combination of work, others, and food quality only effected
the tamarins’ behavior in the bartering task during which food was
limited and effort was required. It is likely that these assessments do
not come together in a whole social assessment for tamarins unless the
constraints on work and differential foods are put in place. Under
more open foraging circumstances, as when tamarins are handed
different types of food, they seem to assess only the difference
between expected and obtained rewards and reject more when those
do not match. Under those conditions, whether or not the difference is
defined socially is irrelevant to the behavior.
To return to the question posed by the title, this research suggests
that inequity assessment is a trait shared among primates with partic-
ular characteristics and in particular circumstances: (a) They are
socially tolerant enough to observe each other working for particular
types of food, (b) they can differentiate quality of food and have food
preferences, and (c) the circumstance demands that they exert effort to
obtain food. If we speculate further, primate species that show social
tolerance through cooperative breeding and food sharing are the
species most likely to be in a position to assess equity among their
group members. These would include capuchins and tamarins among
the New World monkeys, and humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos
(Pan paniscus) among the apes. It seems likely that under circum-
stances in which resources are more limited, social assessments and
evaluations can play a much stronger role in behavior. Others have
suggested similar pressures for cooperation to emerge under compet-
itive circumstances among particular species of primates, including
humans (i.e., Hare, 2007).
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